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I. Work, Family, and the Recreation of Social Class
Wholesale changes in the organization of the economy inevitably
interact with changes in the family. A farm family, for example, which
draws no clear distinction between helping with the harvest and helping
with the dishes, may operate very differently from two computer geeks who
work out of their home offices half the week and travel frequently the rest
of the time. Yet, while the two types of changes (family and market)
generate enormous discussion, the interaction between them is often
obscured. This interaction—and the class, gender, and racial dynamics that
accompany it—produces both vicious and virtuous cycles, reinforcing
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newly created advantages for some parts of the population and making
others worse off.
Trying to understand the interaction of work and family as parts of an
integrated and dynamic system is an enormous undertaking; indeed, Naomi
Cahn and I have recently completed a book length project on the subject
that only begins to address the changes.1 Nevertheless, it is important to
acknowledge the potential interactions, even while recognizing that any
discussion risks simplification and overgeneralization; the alternative may
be not to recognize them at all.
Therefore, this Article will attempt to present an overview of the major
changes underlying work-family interaction with no pretense that any such
discussion can be comprehensive. In addition, it will attempt to describe
the dynamics driving these changes while recognizing that the changes are
mutually reinforcing and that any starting point for the discussion is
necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Finally, it will attempt to highlight the
implications in terms of the production of greater inequality, and the
differential effects by class and race, acknowledging that differences exist
within these groups.
In the end, the Article will maintain that the new dynamic driving the
interaction of work and family is greater specialization in the activities
performed by women. This greater specialization has dramatically
increased the return for investment in women, with college educated
women (approximately a quarter of the current adult population) entering
the workforce to stay and dramatically increasing their earnings. These
women in turn hire other women (and take advantage of the availability of
home health care aides, fast food and frozen dinners, and permanent press
fabrics) to manage what once were all women’s domestic responsibilities.
To take advantage of these expanded employment opportunities, college
educated women have embraced a new set of moral understandings that
replace sexual restraint with greater attention to readiness for childbearing.
The average age of marriage has jumped, and with financial independence
and emotional maturity as the hallmarks of responsible family formation,
these women search longer for compatible and companionate mates.
College-educated women, who were once the least likely group in society
to marry, have become the only group whose marriage and income rates
have increased—and the families they form are more stable than similar
unions thirty years ago.
1.
(2010).

See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
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These new terms for middle class life have, in turn, undermined what
was once universal support for more traditional marriages. The availability
of birth control and abortion has lessened the pressure channeling sex into
early marriage, making cohabitation more common. In addition, women’s
greater independence makes it more feasible for women to leave unhappy
unions or to raise children as single parents. As women’s circumstances
have become less desperate, men feel less compelled to marry the women
they impregnate or to stay with their wives if they find themselves attracted
to someone else. As marriages become less secure, women invest even
more in their own earning potential and choose more carefully before they
do marry. At the same time, the male premium that once allowed working
class men to earn substantially more than working class women has
effectively disappeared, changing the terms on which men and women are
likely to get together, and making stable unions less common. Yet, children
continue to enjoy significant advantages if their parents stay together, and
the parents’ likelihood of doing so has become far more correlated with
race and class than in earlier eras.
The Article concludes that only with recognition of these dynamics
can we hope to recreate shared understandings. One of the dramatic, and
largely untold, stories of the last half century is the wholesale shift in
resources away from children.2 As the economic advantages of the middle
class have increased vis-à-vis the rest of the population, their relative
fertility rates have fallen, and their investment in the children they do have
has skyrocketed. The rest of the population has struggled to deal with the
lack of support for satisfying traditional roles, new more egalitarian ones, or
single parent family needs. The resulting "culture wars" stand in the way of
more realistic efforts to reintegrate work and family.
II. Family Reorganization and the New Information Economy
A. "Technological Shock" and Family Change
In an influential article, economists Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz
maintained that changes in family dynamics and moral understandings

2. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW 119–22 (2000) (demonstrating that family form corresponds to education and
income, and that children in single parent families are dramatically more likely to be in
households below the poverty line).
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could be explained in terms of the same model as "technological shock."3
Economists use the term to describe disruptions in the stable equilibria of
economic sectors.4 Imagine, for example, a region in which four companies
make widgets, each with an established and relatively stable market share.
One company, however, adopts expensive new technology that makes it
possible to produce more widgets with the same resources, and to sell them
therefore at a lower price. Economists maintain that this more efficient
company will increase its market share, forcing the other companies to
invest in the new technology, otherwise adapt to the new market dynamics,
or go out of business.5 This is true even if the other three companies would
prefer to continue as before.
The article’s innovative insight was that this same model could be
applied to courtship. The economists argued that the traditional bargain
underlying sexual exploration was the man’s implied promise to marry the
woman if she became pregnant.6 They maintain that the availability of
effective contraception and abortion constituted "a technology shock" that
allowed women who did not wish to marry at that point in their lives to
engage in sexual activity without requiring or necessarily wanting a
promise to marry.7 The willingness of some women to engage in sex on the
new terms undermined the implicit bargain for everyone, and Akerlof,
Yellen, and Katz maintain that the biggest losers were those women who
wanted marriage and children.8 They had less ability to coax a betrothal
3. See George Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the
United States, 112 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 277, 277–78 (1996) (noting that with the advent
of birth control and abortion, overall birth rates fell, but the incidence of shot gun marriages
fell even more, increasing non-marital births as a percentage of the reduced total). In 1996,
the major alternative theories explaining the increase in the percentage of births outside of
marriage were the disappearance of well paying jobs for less skilled men or the availability
of welfare benefits. Compare WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD
OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996), with CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: SOCIAL POLICY
1950–80 (1984).
4. See Akerlof et al., supra note 3, at 294 (discussing how the economists describe
the older norms: "Before the technology shock it is clear that no woman with positive
pregnancy costs will engage in sexual activity without a promise of marriage").
5. See id. at 279–80 ("A cost-saving innovation almost invariably penalizes
producers who . . . fail to adopt it.").
6. See id. at 307 ("In the old days, if the woman wanted a child, she was typically
able to exact a promise that the man would marry her.").
7. See id. at 306 (stating that the technology shock could have been a significant
factor in the large increase in the out-of-wedlock births even if abortion and female
contraception usage had substantially increased in relation to the number of births and
unmarried women).
8. See id. at 280 ("In the case of female contraception, and abortion, women who
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from a reluctant mate, and became more willing to have children without
marriage.9 The economists emphasize that this could explain a rise in the
percentage of non-marital births coinciding with a substantial drop in the
overall birth rate and the number of unintended pregnancies.10
The article is perhaps most controversial for its use of relatively sterile
economic analysis to explain a moral transformation: the erosion of the
stigma against non-marital childbearing.11
Moreover, more recent
scholarship suggests that women’s willingness to have children outside of
marriage may reflect the women’s reluctance to marry the fathers, and not
just the men’s unwillingness to commit.12 Nonetheless, the model presents
a trenchant class analysis. It suggests that if the terms underlying some
bargains shift, it destabilizes those available to all, and the more influential
players then set the new terms, at least in the short turn, consequently
increasing inequality. This Article suggests that what Akerlof, Yellen, and
Katz described in terms of the limited example of the terms underlying
"shot gun" marriages is true of family relationships more generally.
B. Returns to Specialization and Family Organization
Economists agree that a major change underlying family change in the
last half century has been women’s increasing labor market participation,
and that this change in women’s roles has contributed to family change.13
What they have yet to explain adequately is the class-based nature of family
change. This is true, in part, because the widely cited model of family
economics—Gary Becker’s idea of specialization between home and
want children, and women who, because of indecision or religious conviction have failed to
adopt the new innovations, have lost disproportionately.").
9. See id. at 308 ("In the new world . . . unmarried women who wanted children
would find it increasingly difficult to make (and also to enforce) a contract in which
marriage was promised in the event of pregnancy.").
10. See id. at 307–08 (explaining the theory behind a potential drop in the overall
birthrate due to current familial and sexual trends).
11. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE
HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 156 (2002) (insisting that "technology cannot explain" the
lessened stigma attending non-marital births).
12. See Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Race, Class, and Family Structure, 41
FAM. L.Q. 567, 585 (2007) ("These women’s most vociferous complaints are reserved for
men’s chronic criminal behavior, drug use, violence, and, above all, repeated and flagrant
sexual infidelity.").
13. See CARBONE, supra note 2, at 16–19, 30–35 (examining the economic analysis of
the link between women’s labor market participation and familial change).
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market—largely ignores the more important form of specialization, viz.,
that among women rather than between men and women.14 This increase in
women’s specialization, like the increase in men’s specialization a century
earlier, builds in greater class differences in much the same way adoption of
a new technology does in the Akerlof model.
Gary Becker, a Nobel Prize winning economist, is celebrated for his
introduction of economic analysis to the family realm.15 He maintained that
men "specialized" in the market, while women specialized in the domestic
sphere, and that with the greater entry of women into the paid labor force,
the benefits of this specialization would diminish, undermining the
advantages of family unions.16 Becker is, of course, right that traditional
gender roles have changed and that family instability has increased. What
he has never attempted to explain is why the groups who have most
enthusiastically embraced women’s enhanced labor market opportunities
(viz., college educated women) are the only group in society whose
marriage rates have increased.17
Becker’s analysis, which insisted on the "sexual division of labor
between the market and household sectors,"18 could not take on the class
dynamic, in part, because it missed almost entirely the consequences of
greater specialization within each sex.19 This increase in specialization
14. See id. at 417 ("[T]he increased workforce participation [by women] Becker
emphasizes produces greater, not less, specialization as women trade in the largely
undifferentiated role of wife and mother for a more complex array of activities.").
15. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY, ix–xi (1981) (using "the
assumptions of maximizing behavior, stable preferences, and equilibrium in implicit or
explicit markets to provide a systematic analysis of the family"). For an economic critique
of Becker that maintains that his claims depend on contested auxiliary assumptions to which
economics has no commitment and which lack empirical support, see Robert A. Pollak,
Gary Becker’s Contribution to Family and Household Economics, REV. OF ECON. OF THE
HOUSEHOLD, Jan./April 2003.
16. See id. at 245–48 (explaining the theory that the rapid change in the family
structure was largely affected by "the growth in the earning power of women as the
American economy developed").
17. See Eduardo Porter & Michelle O’Donnell, Facing Middle Age with No Degree,
and No Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at A1 (charting census data showing that the only
group exhibiting a decline in the numbers of the unmarried by the early forties is collegeeducated women.). The decline occurred for only a short period around the turn of the
century: over the last thirty years all women’s marriage rates have declined, but less so for
college graduates than for others. Id.
18. BECKER, supra note 15, at 23.
19. See CARBONE, supra note 2, at 7 ("[E]lsewhere Becker writes that since married
women have been specialized to childbearing and other domestic activities, they have
demanded long-term ‛contracts’ from their husbands.").
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among first men and then women underlies the two great "demographic
transitions"20 remaking the worlds of work and family and the interactions
between them.
The first transition marked the shift from a largely, rural agricultural
society to a more urban industrial one; the second a shift from the industrial
era to an information economy.21 Far from a sharp sexual division of labor
between home and market, agricultural societies combined the two. That is,
while men and women often performed different tasks, they did so in the
same place—on the farm.22 With men and women living and working
together, men oversaw both the farm’s domestic and productive activities,
and husbands were expected to be involved in prescribing children’s
activities and discipline just as women were expected to work side by side
with their husbands when farm life required it.23 To be sure, women took
20. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring After the
Second Demographic Transformation, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607 (2004) (noting that
demographers generally use the term "demographic transition" to mean the changes in a
society as it moves from high birth and mortality rates to lower ones); see Ronald Lee, The
Demographic Transition: Three Centuries, of Fundamental Change, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 167, 167 (Autumn 2003) ("[G]lobal demographic transition has brought
momentous changes, reshaping the economic and demographic life cycles of individuals and
restructuring populations.").
21. Arguably, of course, there was an even earlier transformation, viz., that from a
hunter-gatherer to an agricultural society. This "demographic transition," however,
produced more births as the benefits of agriculture made it possible to sustain more children
born closer together. Nonetheless, the rise of agriculture certainly produced a demographic
transformation as population density rose and the timing and number of births changed, and
it also produced a transformation in the relationship between labor and family organization.
In work that now seems excessively Eurocentric and reductionist, Frederich Engels wrote in
1891 that "the sole exclusive aims of monogamous marriage were to make the man supreme
in the family, and to propagate, as the future heirs to his wealth, children indisputably his
own." See FRIEDERICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE
STATE 57–58 (4th ed. 1964) (1891) (arguing that with the rise of agriculture, property
ownership became important, and as the importance of property ownership increased, so did
the importance of insuring women’s fidelity so that a man might insure that "his" property
went to his descendents and not someone else’s). Of course, as that happened, people also
became more inclined to settle in one place, and with more stable agricultural life, work, and
family occurred in the same place, with the male head of household overseeing both. See
generally LINDA R. HIRSCHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX
(1998) (providing a modern critique of such developments by elaborating on the theoretical
link between property ownership and fidelity).
22. See Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The
Rhetoric of Women’s History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 22–23 (1998) (discussing the historical
literature describing the rise of the ideology of the separate spheres and arguing that the
overgeneralizations denying women any autonomy within a farm economy are inaccurate).
23. See id. at 23 (stating that work patterns of men deviated even farther from the
traditional role of women).
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on more of the cooking and sewing and men managed more of the buying
and selling, women oversaw nursery care and men trained their sons to take
on adult responsibilities, but the relationship between husband and wife was
more often described in vertical rather than horizontal terms.24
The sharp differentiation of home and market and their idealization as
separate realms came with industrialization. A large literature describes the
"cult of domesticity," the rise of the "separate spheres," the ideal of "true
womanhood," and the remaking of family life from a "little
commonwealth" to a domestic sanctuary.25 This reorganization marked
middle class women’s removal from the community’s productive life as a
historical novelty, and redirected the family’s activities to make
dramatically greater investment in children possible.26
The second transformation, which came during the rise of the
information economy during the latter half of the twentieth century,
dissolved the strict separation of home and community, and redirected
middle class women’s activities back toward greater participation in the
larger society.27
Both transformations redefined the relationship between home and
market, and produced greater investment in children by delaying
childbearing and reducing overall fertility. Both did so, at least in part, by
redefining gender roles and by moving to counter overreliance on the
shotgun marriage.28 Moreover, in both transformations, at least in the short
24. See id. at 23–25 (explaining the impact of women’s autonomy on the economic
relationship between men and women).
25. See id. at 15–16 (documenting overuse of the term "separate spheres"); JOAN
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1–3 (2000) (exploring the enduring prevalence of
domesticity in American society); see JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY
LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 140 (1970) (exemplifying changes in family life by using the
Plymouth Colony); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 238–50 (1985) (examining the use of contract and the
judicial creation of child custody rights as elements in the transition from one family system
to another).
26. See CARBONE, supra note 2, at 62–66 ("The middle classes . . . began to invest
more in each child in terms of love, affection, training, and education, and the historical
relationship between higher birthrates and class standing was reversed.").
27. See id. (explaining that women began to take part in activities outside of the
household through this latter transformation).
28. See Akerlof et al., supra note 3, at 307–08 ("[T]he stigma associated with out-ofwedlock motherhood has declined endogenously."); see HIRCSHMAN & LARSON, supra note
21, at 92 (1998) (explaining the impact of liberalism and personhood on the traditional
perception of viewing sexuality as a type of moral problem); see Jane E. Larson, "Women
Understand so Little, They Call My Good Nature ‛Deceit’": A Feminist Rethinking of
Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 392 (1993) ("Victorian society enforced female modesty
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term, changes in family organization exacerbated societal inequality as the
wealthier middle class used the benefits of the new system to enhance its
class standing.29
1. Industrialization, Male Specialization, and Women’s Agency
The key to both transformations, and their corresponding
reorganizations of the worlds of work and family, is the role of greater
specialization that took place among males and females and the
reorganization of family life necessary to produce the greater investment
corresponding to that specialization.30 The first transformation created a
new middle class to staff the professions and managerial ranks of the
industrial economy.31 Critical to its success was greater investment in
boys’ formal education and training, which required in turn postponing
marriage and entry into the labor force.32 Yet the cities that came with
industrialization posed greater temptations for adolescents, and made
supervision more challenging than in the smaller communities of colonial
America.33 The solution was greater emphasis on women’s "purity" and
their agency in overseeing a redefined domestic realm rededicated to
childrearing.34 A new moral code accompanied the transformation.35 As
by harshly castigating immodest women, particularly unmarried women who became
pregnant.").
29. See MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA
COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790–1865, at 184–85 (1981) ("[T]he parental generation had created
the educational institutions and financed the schooling that qualified their children for more
skilled and lucrative occupations."); see generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, 37–40
(describing literature that shows greater class-based differences in family structure to the
detriment of children).
30. See BECKER, supra note 15, at 43–44 (commenting that specialization by either the
male or the female will affect the other, and consequently the family as a whole, due to the
interdependence within the relationship).
31. See RYAN, supra note 29, at 153 (describing the rise and particularly the allure of
white-collar employment as industrialism took hold of the economy during the middle of the
19th century).
32. See id. at 165–79 (explaining that many parents deliberately delayed their
children’s entry into the workforce, often sacrificing part of their financial resources to do
so, in order to increase their children’s education and thus the chances of success in whitecollar employment).
33. See id. at 162 ("Boy children, however, were increasingly distanced from the roles
of their fathers. Their remoteness may account for the fact that boys were often described as
restless inhabitants of the private domain.").
34. See WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 1–3 (describing the existence of discrete gender
roles for both men and women that justify separate responsibilities); Larson, supra note 28,
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women become more able and willing to say "no,"36 the number of brides
who gave birth within eight and a half months of their weddings declined
from thirty percent in 1800 to ten percent by 1860, the average number of
children per family fell from eight in 1800 to four by century’s end, and the
average age of marriage rose.37
These changes affected the moral understandings of the country as a
whole in spite of the fact that the urban middle class, the driving force
behind the changes, constituted a tiny part of the population.38 Newly
created women’s magazines, which were only too happy to offer courtship
suggestions, influenced the farm wives who would constitute the majority
of women until the much greater urbanization of the twentieth century.39
And class divisions ironically served to reinforce, rather than undermine,
the new order.40 Social historian Mary Ryan emphasizes that the cultural
divide in upstate New York involved the often-pejorative comparison of
native-born Protestants with newly-arriving Catholic immigrants.41 The
at 392 (contrasting the Victorian gender paradigms in which "women were held to be
‛naturally modest’ and for the most part without sexual desire . . . [and] men were portrayed
as ‛sexual brutes’, obsessed with sex and disposed to . . . exploit the female’s trusting and
affectionate nature").
35. See WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 1 ("The ideology of domesticity held that men
‛naturally’ belong in the market because they are competitive and aggressive; women belong
in the home because of their ‛natural’ focus on relationships, children, and an ethic of
care.").
36. See Larson, supra note 28, at 388–90 ("Victorian culture exalted sexual restraint
and designated women as caretakers of society’s sexual virtue,"); CARL N. DEGLER, AT
ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 180–
83 (Oxford Univ. Press 1981) (describing the declining birth rates during the 18th and 19th
centuries that followed women’s greater ability to decline sexual intercourse as changes in
gender relations due to the availability of land as well as industrialization).
37. Larson, supra note 28, at 392.
38. See id. at 389 ("Victorian idealization of sexual restraint did not translate into
actual behavior . . . [but] reflected moral aspirations regarding freedom and order,
masculinity and femininity.").
39. See Janet Galligani Casey, Farm Women, Letters to the Editor, and the Limits of
Autobiography Theory, 28 J. MOD. LITERATURE 89, 91 (2004) (drawing on letters to the
editor in women’s magazines to show the influence of and resistance to middle class models
of femininity). See generally Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism:
Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89
(1998) (explaining that this model of gendered domesticity persists, and interferes with a
more thorough reorganization of work and family to meet the needs of a new age).
40. Cf. Casey, supra note 39, at 98 ("[The] letters in [The Farmer’s Wife] . . . cohere
around a social group that challenged certain middle-class notions of women.").
41. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 29, at 155–56 (discussing the lower birth rates among
native-born women compared to Catholic immigrants in the mid-19th century as a result of
firmly entrenched middle-class notions regarding female sexuality).
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Protestant middle class identified moral superiority with emphasis on their
daughters’ chastity, their determination to keep their children away from
the temptations of either employment or romance at too young an age, their
investment in their sons’ educations and training, and their restriction of
family size.42 The opinion leaders in newspapers, legislatures, courts, and
many pulpits heralded the new middle class standards as the moral order of
the day, and the standard by which other classes might be found wanting.43
Child labor and mandatory school attendance laws, after all, reflected the
judgment of enlightened middle class reformers that the practices of poor
and immigrant families were barbaric.44
The net result of these changes from the 1840’s through the 1920’s:
 redefinition of the foundation of middle class male success
from farm ownership and the crafts to the professions and the
management ranks of the industrial economy, which in turn
placed a greater emphasis on formal education;45
42. See, e.g., id. at 184–85 ("In retrospect, it seems that the native-born [and middleclass] residents . . . had carried through an elaborate and largely successful strategy for
reproducing the middle class."). The Catholic working classes, in contrast, often depended
on their children’s labor for their families’ survival, creating incentives for larger families
that transcended religious differences. Moreover, factory employment, which for working
class families could start even before the teen years, made parental supervision that much
more difficult and further encouraged younger marriages. Id. See also Elizabeth H. Pleck, A
Mother’s Wages: Income Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896–1911, in
THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 490, 492–93 (Michael Gordon
ed., 3d ed. 1983) (suggesting that children in Catholic families worked to support their
families due to "the importance of the family above individual preference").
43. See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE P LANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK
AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 192–241 (1988) (describing the gulf between
slaveholding and enslaved women in the antebellum American South); JACQUELINE JONES,
LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM
SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 1–151 (1985) (comparing the experiences of free and enslaved
black women in southern United States); Kerber, supra note 22, at 10 (explaining that
examinations of women’s roles in the 19th century have historically been limited to middle
class standards).
44. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1062–68 (1992) (describing the history
of such legislation, observing that Catholic organizations constituted some of the of the most
vocal opponents, and concluding that school and work practices often served to reinforce the
cultural identity of some immigrant communities); see also LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT
ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 1810 (1999) (illustrating how Protestant child-savers imposed
"standards of proper parenting [that] were not only antagonistic to the practices of many of
these immigrants but also often inimical to the economic necessities of their lives.").
45. See RYAN, supra note 29, at 163 (explaining the concern in one upstate New York
town regarding the lack of a school system that could properly educate the town’s youth and
their actions to make education more available).
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greater separation in both physical and ideological terms of the
commercial world of paid employment from the domestic
world of home and family;46
the rise of the culture of domesticity, emphasis on women’s
virtue and the remaking of middle class women’s roles to
elevate the status of mothers and their importance to children’s
education and moral instruction;47
an increase in the average age of marriage, decline in the
number of brides giving birth within eight months of marriage,
and a dramatic decline in fertility, which fell by half over the
course of the nineteenth century.48

2. The Information Economy, Female Specialization, and Women’s
Autonomy
The second transformation began in similar fashion in the twentieth
century as technology transformed the economy.49 The "post-industrial
economy" in which we now live has moved away from heavy
manufacturing to greater emphasis on the "information economy" and the
service sector.50 The result is even greater returns to education, this time
for both men and women, as the new technologies have created greater
demand for well-educated "knowledge" workers, and expanded demand for
the types of services women historically performed, such as administrative
and health services.51 Together with globalization, the new economy
46. See WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 1 (describing the "organization of market work
around the ideal of a worker who works full time and overtime and takes little or no time off
for childbearing or child rearing" in effect forcing the caregiver to specialize only in skills in
the home).
47. See id. (describing the bifurcated nature of men’s public obligations and women’s
private responsibilities); Kerber, supra note 22, at 9–11 (asserting that the concept of men
and women occupying separate spheres first appeared in the early 19th century and
increased in popularity throughout that century).
48. CARBONE, supra note 2, at 63.
49. See Richard G. Harris, The Knowledge-Based Economy: Intellectual Origins and
New Economic Perspectives, 3 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 21, 22 (2001) (commenting that the
early 1980s witnessed "the beginnings of a great new era, the third industrial revolution,
founded on new technologies rooted in computers and the potential of new information
technologies").
50. See id. at 22–23 ("The economy of bricks and mortar was being replaced with
software, CDs, and digitized DNA codes. The metaphor was complete with the emergence
of the Internet.").
51. See id. at 25 (explaining that human knowledge still plays an important part in a
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combines greater opportunities with greater competitive pressures from
abroad, producing greater returns for those who can compete in an
international economy, but a corresponding decline in the demand for the
blue collar male labor associated with the manufacturing era.52
Just as the nineteenth century changes brought greater specialization
among men (with greater payoffs for male education), the twentieth century
changes, in parallel fashion, involve greater specialization among women.53
With growth in the number of working women, not only could women enter
management and the professions alongside men, but new positions opened
as women supervised other women in expanding hospital, restaurant, office,
and retail settings.54 Moreover, the new group of high earning mothers
hires women from other economic classes to care for their children and
(along with fast food, frozen, and restaurant meals) to perform what were
once viewed as mothers’ domestic responsibilities.55
This change in women’s roles from generalists, where the vast
majority oversaw cooking, cleaning, childcare, and home and family
management, to specialists who choose from a variety of work-family
combinations has required, like its nineteenth century counterpart, a
reorganization of family life and a new moral code.56 This new moral code
starts with the remaking of the middle class transition to adulthood.57
The sexual revolution and women’s movements that we now identify
with the sixties remade middle class morality from an emphasis on
knowledge-based economy, thus requiring higher levels of education from its employees).
52. See id. at 22–23 (contrasting "the de-industrialization of the American economy,
and what appeared to many to be the irrevocable decline of the American economic system"
with "knowledge-based growth promis[ing] ever increasing wealth based on the emergence
of entirely new goods and activities").
53. See CARBONE, supra note 2, at 16–19 (asserting that not only have women seen
increased specialization of women in many areas of the workforce, but that women have
benefitted from that change through gains in autonomy).
54. See id. (noting that despite the increased role of women throughout the public
sector, traditional family roles remained constant for men and women).
55. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and
Their Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 40–44 (2007) (describing how "reduced market
discrimination against women and technological advances" changed women’s roles by,
among other things, increasing the efficiency of household appliances and decreasing the
gender wage gap).
56. See CARBONE, supra note 2, at 16–19 (explaining that women’s increased
autonomy gives them more ability to influence marriage dynamics as well as seek a
divorce).
57. See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 55, at 36–38 (commenting on the growth of
cohabitation between men and women as either a precursor or a substitute for marriage).
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woman’s virtue to concern for equality and responsibility.58
The
transformation began as the baby boomers reached their college years.59
The new demographic bridled at college parietal rules and sexual double
The "pill" galvanized the shift from abstinence to
standards.60
contraception as the hallmark of responsible behavior.61 The emotionally
agonizing choice of abortion also reinforced the conviction that
childbearing should be reserved for the right partner at the right time in
life.62 The media celebrated the new sexual freedom,63 and by the eighties,
the majority of Americans no longer condemned pre-marital sexuality.64 In
1997, a Gallup poll found that fifty-five percent of American adults
believed that premarital sex was not wrong, and among the most directly
affected, viz., those aged eighteen to twenty-nine, seventy-five percent
58. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 25–29 (2006) (arguing for a balance of power and individual
autonomy within the institution of marriage, primarily through limited governmental
involvement); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 44–45 (noting that famed feminist
author Betty Friedan called for greater involvement by men in family obligations in order to
help women enter the public workforce).
59. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 249 (2005) [hereinafter COONTZ,
MARRIAGE] (explaining that the women’s revolutions of the sixties were largely the result of
social developments that had been occurring without great alarm for decades).
60. See id. at 248 (describing the "attack on the whole 1950s package of beliefs about
women’s roles, courtship, and marriage" as part of a larger pattern of young political
movements taking place at the time against traditional norms).
61. See Akerlof et al., supra note 3, at 277–303 (arguing that the availability of
contraception and abortion ironically contributed to the increase in non-marital births as
women assumed responsibility for avoiding pregnancy, and men no longer felt obligated to
marry unintentionally pregnant partners); see Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 55, at 41–42
(arguing that not only did the "pill" serve as a reliable method of birth control over which the
woman had full control, it also allowed the women to be more deliberate in courtship).
62. See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 55, at 41–42 (suggesting that the availability
of abortion additionally permitted women to avoid marriage to "bad matches" because of
unplanned pregnancies).
63. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Changing Pathway to Marriage: Trends in
Dating, First Unions, and Marriage Among Young Adults, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED:
RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 168, 170 (Steven M. Tipton & John
Witte Jr. eds., 2005) (noting that ninety percent of women born between 1933 and 1942 were
either virgins when they married or had engaged in their first intercourse with the man they
subsequently married, whereas today, the average age of first intercourse is seventeen and
the average age of first marriage is twenty-five).
64. See The Gallup Poll, For the 1st Time, Most in U.S. Say Sex Before Marriage Is
Not Wrong, 17 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 186, 186 (1985) (reporting that of the adult
Americans in 1986 who had an opinion on premarital sex, fifty-eight percent believed that it
was not wrong, compared to seventy-six percent who in 1969 declared premarital sex
unacceptable).
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agreed that "pre-marital sexual relations are not wrong."65 Moreover,
actions reflected changing attitudes: 2002 data indicate that by age twenty,
seventy-seven percent of respondents had had sex, and seventy-five percent
had had premarital sex.66 By age forty-four, ninety-five percent of
respondents (ninety-four percent of women, ninety-six percent of men, and
ninety-seven percent of those who had ever had sex) had had premarital
sex,67 and the average age of marriage had moved from the early to the late
twenties.68
The remaking of moral understandings produced a cycle of reinforcing
shifts in attitudes. As Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz demonstrated, once
women gained greater ability to avoid unplanned pregnancies, men felt less
obliged to marry the women they impregnated.69 As non-marital sexuality
became more acceptable, so too did the children who resulted, making their
mothers more willing to raise them without marrying.70 In a parallel
fashion, the shotgun marriages of the fifties and changing gender
relationships produced the divorces of the seventies.71 More divorce fueled
greater wariness about marriage, increasing women’s convictions that they
need to be able to rely on their own earning power.72 Greater female
education and employment in turn made women more insistent on more
equal relationships, and more able and willing to wait for the "right" man

65. Frank Newport, Gallup Poll Review from the Poll Editors—Sexual Norms: Where
Does America Stand Today?, THE GALLUP POLL, Dec. 1997, http://www.hiho.ne.jp/taku77/refer/sexnorm.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
66. Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954–2003, 122
PUB. HEALTH REP. 73, 76 (2007).
67. See id. at 73 (stating that based on these data, Lawrence Finer concludes that
"[a]lmost all Americans have sex before marrying").
68. Id. at 74.
69. See Akerlof et al., supra note 3, at 281 ("The sexual revolution, by making the
birth of the child the physical choice of the mother, makes marriage and child support a
social choice of the father . . . .[The] decisions of the father depend upon the decisions and
options of the mother.").
70. See id. at 308 (noting also that agency adoptions fell by one-half in the five years
following the legalization of abortion).
71. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 167 (1992) [hereinafter COONTZ, THE WAY] (observing that rising
divorce rates beginning in the forties actually predated any shifts in favorable attitudes
towards divorce, which did not occur until the late sixties).
72. See id. at 166 (noting also that "with longer work experience and greater education
equalization, they became freer to leave an unhappy marriage" and "as divorce became more
of a possibility, women tended to hedge their bets by insisting on their right to work").
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before they married.73 With these changes, the average age of marriage has
risen steeply, fertility has dropped, and the variety of family forms has
multiplied.74 For women, the median age of marriage rose from twenty in
1961 to twenty-five in 2005.75 For men, it increased from twenty-two to
twenty-seven in the same time period.76 The societal structure and support
underlying more traditional family formation (e.g., high school romances
and unintended pregnancies that lead to early marriage) have atrophied.77
These changes have also transformed the relationship between work
and family. In the fifties and early sixties, early marriage locked men into
the responsibility of providing for their families and women into
childrearing roles that left them with little independence.78 Today, the
twenties have become a time of exploration with movement in and out of
school, in and out of jobs, and in and out of relationships.79 Those in the
middle class have adjusted, using the period to acquire education,
experience, and flexibility that has enhanced their position in the new
73. See Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Law and the Structure of the American Family,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 165–66 (2006) (observing that the average age of marriage increased
most in states that eliminated all consideration of fault and arguing that the result reflects
women’s willingness to search longer for the right spouse in states with less marital
security); McLanahan, supra note 20, at 609 (describing a rise in the average age of collegeeducated women with children under the age of five from twenty-six in 1970 to thirty-two in
2000).
74. See ELIZABETH GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE NEW LATER
MOTHERHOOD 53–95 (2007) (stating that women who give birth at thirty-four live longer
and with fewer health issues than women who give birth at any other age, and that older
women generally have more resources, and marriages that are happier, more stable, and
more egalitarian).
75. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ESTIMATED MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, BY
SEX: 1890 TO THE PRESENT (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
hh-fam/ms2.pdf.
76. Id.
77. See COONTZ, MARRIAGE, supra note 59, at 266–78 (listing as factors that have
altered the institution of marriage: the reduced earning potential of men, the availability of
acceptable alternatives to marriage including divorce and cohabitation, relaxed sexual
norms, increases in longevity, same-sex marriages, and lessened societal expectations of
marriage as a gateway to adulthood).
78. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 134–69 (1991)
(arguing that the more children a woman has under the age of five, the less her power in the
marriage relationship).
79. See THE NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD, http://www.transad.pop.
upenn.edu (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (presenting a comprehensive examination of "cultural,
economic, and demographic changes [that] have altered the path that many young adults
follow as they strive for the traditional milestones of adulthood") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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marriage and employment markets.80 The less-educated in the meantime
have fallen farther behind.81
The college-educated, who postpone childrearing until the parents
achieve a measure of financial self-sufficiency and emotional maturity,
have become more likely to marry and less likely to divorce than the rest of
the population, with two-parent families that remain intact, replicating the
statistics that existed before no-fault divorce, the pill, and legalized
abortion.82 At the same time, the rest of the country has seen skyrocketing
rates of non-marital births, divorce, and single-parent families, magnifying
the effects of income inequality on children.83 According to sociologist
Sara McLanahan, only seven percent of children in the late nineties were
born outside of marriage to the top quarter of women, as defined by the
mother’s education, compared to forty-three percent in the bottom-educated
quartile.84 For couples with four-year degree, divorce rates peaked in the
late seventies with roughly a quarter of marriages ending within ten years.85
The rates then fell to seventeen percent by the late eighties.86 For couples
without college degrees, divorce rates declined only slightly (to about
thirty-two percent) by the late eighties, and they rose throughout the
nineties.87
The hallmark of this new middle-class ethic is later ages of family
formation, when adult behavior has stabilized.88 For the best-educated
80. See COONTZ, MARRIAGE, supra note 59, at 285–86 ("Modern men tend to want
mates who are on a similar level in terms of education or earning potential. . . . Being a
smart, achieving women used to be perceived as a liability in the marriage market . . . but is
now a big asset.").
81. See id. at 286–90 (explaining that the "corrosive effects of unemployment and
poverty" lead many young, low-income parents to avoid marriage entirely, opting instead to
be single parents).
82. See McLanahan, supra note 20, at 608 ("Children who were born to mothers from
the most-advantaged backgrounds are making substantial gains in resources . . . . [T]heir
mothers are more mature and more likely to be working at well-paying jobs. These children
were born into stable unions and are spending more time with their fathers.").
83. See id. at 608–11 ("[C]hildren born to mothers from the most disadvantaged
backgrounds are making smaller gains and, in some instances, even losing parental
resources.").
84. Id. at 611–12.
85. Id. at 612–13.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See COONTZ, MARRIAGE, supra note 59, at 276–77 (arguing that men and women
should weigh the "potential gains of getting married . . . against the possibilities offered by
staying single to pursue higher education or follow a better job").
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quartile of American women, mothers’ median age rose from twenty-six in
1970 to thirty-two in 2000.89 For mothers in the bottom quartile, it
remained relatively flat in the early twenties.90 For those who avoid early
child-bearing, conventional families with two married parents and a high
degree of stability follow to a remarkable degree with a minimum of
external coercion.91
The net result of these changes has been:
 greater return for investment in women’s education, as college
degrees correspond to both enhanced marriage and
employment opportunities;92
 reintegration of women into the paid labor market, as two
incomes have become increasingly essential to realize the
benefits of middle class life;93
 remaking of the moral terms of relationships, with the stigma
associated with pre-marital sexuality waning, women
assuming responsibility for birth control and abortion, and
responsibility toward children replacing sexual control as the
most widely shared moral imperative;94
 greater class-based disparities, including:
o age of first birth (increasing substantially for college
educated, less so for others);95
89. McLanahan, supra note 20, at 609–610.
90. Id. It should be noted, however, that fertility rates have also dropped, especially
for teens. Between 1960 and 2000, for example, births to fifteen to nineteen-year-old
women fell by more than half. The composition of the remaining births nonetheless varies
by race and class. White women, for example, have higher birth rates in every age group
above twenty-five, while African-Americans have higher birth rates in every cohort under
twenty-five, even though both races report substantial declines in teen childbearing. CHILD
TRENDS DATABANK, PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN 1–2, 8 (2003),
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/75_PDF.pdf.
91. See McLanahan, supra note 20, at 618 (describing the greater influence women
exercised over their careers and marriage if they chose to delay pregnancy, due not only to
increased financial resources but also increased maturity).
92. See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 55, at 44–55 (noting that wage instability in
the overall job market has simultaneously affected how women view the prospect of
marriage and possibly increased the value of delaying marriage to pursue education or a
career).
93. See Harris, supra note 49, at 30 (noting the heightening demand and wages for
skilled and educated workers as the country has shifted to a knowledge-based economy, as
well as the simultaneous drop in both demand and wages for unskilled workers).
94. See McLanahan, supra note 20, at 618 (presenting evidence of changes in sexual
norms, which have in turn affected attitudes concerning pregnancy and child-rearing).
95. Id. at 609–10.
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likelihood of marriage (increasing for college educated
women, declining for others);96
o births outside of marriage (decreasing for the best off,
leveling off at high levels for the worst off, still
increasing for the center);97
o income (rising for college educated; stagnant for
others);98
o work/leisure balance (high income men and women
work more and have less leisure than forty years ago;
working class men have similar or more leisure time
than forty years ago, working class women are in
between the other groups).99

o

III. Rebuilding the Foundation
A. Recognizing the Effect of Work on Family
If economic reorganization destabilizes family life, then creation of
new family understandings requires rebuilding the pathways for the least
advantaged to realize the benefits of the new system. Family life has
become an engine of economic inequality in part because the poorest
Americans can neither take advantage of the new system, which requires
access to the resources that make greater education and achievement
possible, nor maintain their position in the traditional system, which
permitted young men to earn enough money to make early marriage
feasible and locked women into dependent roles that made exit difficult.100
96. See COONTZ, MARRIAGE, supra note 59, at 285–90 ("[M]any [lower-class] women
today see no point in marrying unless their prospective husband has both the economic
prospects and the emotional dependability to make pooling their resources worthwhile.").
97. McLanahan, supra note 20, at 611–12.
98. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, LONG-RUN CHANGES IN THE U.S. WAGE
STRUCTURE 2, 34 fig. 6 (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/
bpea_macro/forum/200709goldin_katz.pdf (observing that the wage premium for a college
graduate compared to a high school graduate has widened dramatically since 1980,
producing a "polarization" in wage structure between high paying jobs requiring high levels
of education and low paying jobs requiring less education).
99. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 198 (summarizing literature that shows
that leisure time did not differ by social class in 1965, but now varies substantially, with
well-educated men and women working substantially more hours than the less educated); see
also McLanahan, supra note 20, at 612–14 (explaining that college-educated men on
average spend more time with their children than men without college educations).
100. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 157 (1989)
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Standing in the way of systematically rebuilding family life—and the
interaction between the reorganized family and the workplace—is profound
disagreement on how to respond. The wealthiest areas of the country, those
most dominated by the secular, college-educated middle class, have
embraced the move to new practical and normative understandings about
family life.101 The poorer, more religious, and more traditional areas of the
country view the new morality, which deregulates sexuality and dismantles
gender-based roles, as a threat to an increasingly fragile family system.102
Yet, the political opposition to the new system promotes measures that are
ineffective, if not counterproductive, because of the refusal to acknowledge
the links between family and the economy.103
The failure to do so is understandable. The successful middle class
reaps the benefits of the new system by training their children to take
advantage of new opportunities; they manage the conflicts between public
temptation and private discipline by preparing their children for adult
autonomy.104
More traditional families, in contrast, expect public
reinforcement of private morality, and are distressed by their children’s
failure to live up to their parents’ principles.105 In other work, we refer to
the core of this more traditional system as "communities on the cusp."106
While the college-educated enjoy the family stability of a more traditional
era, and the poorest Americans have non-marital birth and divorce rates that
have plateaued at very high levels, the family instability—in terms of both
divorce and non-marital birth rates—of the middle has continued to rise.107
(explaining that women with young children have the least power in relationships because
the combination of their devotion to their children and economic dependence gives them
little ability to leave, and without a credible threat of "exit," they also lack "voice" within the
union).
101. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at ch. 4 (examining how differences
regarding family values play into the fault lines created by religion, personality differences,
and political realignment).
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id.
104. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, C LASS ACTS AND GENDER WORKS :
RETHINKING THE E LECTORAL AND EVERYDAY P OLITICS OF WORK AND F AMILY (2010)
(emphasizing that the middle class uses the language of autonomy and trains its children to
exercise personal choice in defining the character of their adulthood while the working class
looks for greater structure and more permanent values to guide its children).
105. See, e.g., Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality, NAT’L
PASTORAL LIFE CENT., http://www.nplc.org/commonground/papers/whiteheadpaper.htm.
106. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 73.
107. See McLanahan, supra note 20, at 612–13 (showing rising trends in divorce during
the first ten years of marriage and non-marital birthrates among the middle class).
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Andrew Cherlin observes that the United States differs from the rest of
the developed world in its greater marriage and divorce rates.108 Many
American small towns, suburbs, and rural communities continue to revolve
around married couples; over the last forty years, they have responded to
more divorce with remarriage. In the last fifteen years, however, the group
whose non-marital birth rates have increased most dramatically are white,
high school graduates in their early twenties; women whose family
formation patterns are critical to the future of marriage in communities on
the cusp.109
The political and ideological response to these developments has been
a moral call to arms; critics such as James Q. Wilson accordingly dismiss
Akerlof and Yellen for their purported failure to address the change in
moral values.110 They miss entirely that while the economists use the sterile
language of bargaining analysis, they are describing a normative shift—one
that proceeds from the inability of the most vulnerable women to command
either the right marital terms or the ability to postpone pregnancy
effectively, and produces in turn a shift in the understandings that channel
such behavior.
The insistence on viewing sexual morality apart from economic
change and of viewing the perspectives of high school graduate whites as
though they were universal has been the promotion of policies that cannot
address the nation’s needs as a whole. The result has, ironically,
exacerbated class and regionally based inequalities as the wealthier states
build in greater support for the transformation to the new middle class
model while poorer states block assistance that might further undermine
traditional practices.
These policies exacerbate class and regional differences. Consider
teen pregnancies, which overwhelmingly result in single parent families,
108. See Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15
THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 33, 46 (2005) ("[W]hat makes the United States most distinctive is
the combination of high marriage and high divorce rates—which implies that Americans
typically experience more transitions into and out of marriages than do people in other
countries.").
109. See STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf ("Birth
rates have risen considerably for unmarried women in their twenties and over, while
declining or changing little for unmarried teenagers.").
110. See WILSON, supra note 11, at 156–57 (suggesting that technology alone cannot
explain why women are more likely to keep unwanted children rather than get an abortion or
give the child up for adoption). Wilson argues the fact that "keeping a child without a
husband entails no major social costs" plays a part in women’s decisions to get an abortion
or give a child up for adoption. Id.
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limit the mother’s educational opportunities, and have life-long effects on
the child’s prospects.111 Between 1988 and 2000, teen pregnancies fell
substantially across the United States, but they fell most dramatically in
New England, dropping by at least a third in Massachusetts, Connecticut
and Maine, and closer to forty percent in New Hampshire and Vermont.112
In contrast, teen pregnancies barely dropped at all in Mississippi and
Wyoming, and only slightly in West Virginia, Texas, Idaho and New
Mexico.113 The diverging teen birth rates reinforce regional patterns, with
New England leading the country in declining teen pregnancies, births, and
overall fertility while the Southern (particularly Mississippi), border
(especially Arkansas and Oklahoma), and Southwestern states (Texas, New
Mexico and Arizona) retain much higher rates of reproduction at earlier
ages.114 Looking just at whites, the regional and wealth differences are
even more concentrated. The states with the lowest white teen birth
rates are the wealthy mid-Atlantic states: New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island.115 In contrast, the highest
white teen birth rates were concentrated in the poorest border and
Southern states: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee.116 The Northeast as a whole has most unequivocally embraced
the new family patterns (followed by the West Coast and the upper
Midwest) while whites in the belt that runs from Oklahoma through West
Virginia (followed by the South, the plains, and the mountain West) remain
most opposed.
These patterns reinforce others. Family form has become one of the
best predictors of electoral politics. Michigan political scientists Ron
Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert demonstrate that family characteristics showed
a significant correlation with voting preferences in the last three presidential
elections.117 They measure family factors in terms of a host of variables
111. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
TEEN PREGNANCY (1992).
112. GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY STATISTICS: NATIONAL AND STATE
TRENDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 13 (2006) [hereinafter GUTTMACHER INST., TEEN
PREGNANCY], http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/09/12/ USTPstats.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See RON LESTHAEGHE & LISA NEIDERT, POPULATION STUDIES CENTER, THE
"SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION" IN THE U.S.: SPATIAL PATTERNS AND CORRELATES 18
(2006) [hereinafter LESTHAEGHE & NEIDERT, D EMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION],
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr06-592.pdf (showing CNN exit poll data
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that include postponing marriage and childbearing, overall fertility,
marriage, abortion, and cohabitation rates.118 Lesthaeghe and Neidert
conclude that "the very strong negative correlation found here between the
SDT dimension119 . . . and the percentage votes for G.W. Bush is to our
knowledge one of the highest spatial correlations between demographic and
voting behavior on record."120
The fact that the areas of the country that have yet to make the
transition to the new family system are both the poorest and most politically
conservative means that these regions are also most likely to oppose
support for practices that would speed the transition. Consider the trends in
unintended pregnancy rates. Unplanned pregnancies reflect access to
contraception and disciplined use. The most reliable contraceptives—
injectables, IUD’s, and the pill—require access to a doctor.121 The
Guttmacher Institute reports that "between 1994–2001, the unintended
pregnancy rate rose twenty-nine percent among women living below the
poverty level even while it declined twenty percent among women with
higher economic status."122 It rose for high school drop outs while
declining for college graduates.123 With restrictions on public funding for
demonstrating statistical correlation between family factors such as marital status and
presence of children and choice of presidential candidate in 2000 and 2004 elections); Ron
Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, Voting and Families: America’s Second Demographic
Transition, NEW GEOGRAPHY, Dec. 11, 2008 [hereinafter Lesthaeghe & Neidert, Voting and
Families], available at http://www.newgeography.com/content/00461-voting-and-familiesamerica%E2%80%99s-second-demographic-transition (showing that family characteristics
influenced voting preferences in 2008 much in the same way they influenced preferences in
2000 and 2004).
118. See LESTHAEGHE & N EIDERT, D EMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, supra note 117, at 5
(using factors such as the postponement of marriage, greater prevalence of cohabitation and
same sex households, postponement of parenthood, sub-replacement fertility, and a higher
incidence of abortion to show spatial correlation to voting behavior).
119. See Lesthaeghe & Neidert, Voting and Families, supra note 117 (explaining that
the "second demographic transition" corresponds to the changes produced by the new
information economy. The first demographic transition is the transition associated with the
transition to industrialization).
120. Id.
121. See generally James Trussel et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A
Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494 (1995) (showing that more reliable
forms of birth control are both more expensive and out of reach for many without health
insurance or public program access).
122. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 26 (2006),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf.
123. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended
Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH
90, 94 (2006) ("[W]omen aged 20 and older without a high school diploma had an
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contraception and the availability of health insurance, the disparities also
reflect race.124 Latinas, for example, are three to four times more likely
than white women to use no method of contraception.125
These factors produce interlocking virtuous and vicious cycles. The
wealthiest states are the most liberal and the most likely to support
comprehensive sex education, public support for contraception, and
abortion.126 These policies reduce overall fertility rates and do so most
dramatically (in comparison with other states) for the poorest women, who
would have the greatest difficulty in restricting reproduction in the absence
of public support. Declining rates of unintended pregnancy increase the
average age at which mothers have children, which in turn increases the
overall well being of children in these states.127 In addition, wealthier states
are also more likely to attract well-educated college graduates from other

unintended pregnancy rate about three times that of college graduates, and they were less
likely than women in other education subgroups to end an unintended pregnancy by
abortion."). As a consequence, such women’s rate of unintended childbearing was "four
times that of college graduates." Id.
124. See Andrea Miller & Rebecca Wind, Contraception Needs and Services, 2006,
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, March 1, 2009, http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/
2005/02/22/index.html ("Among women in need of publicly supported contraceptive
services and supplies in 2006, seventy-one percent (12.4 million) were poor or low-income
adult women, and twenty-nine percent (5.1 million) were women younger than age 20 and of
any income level."). Of those women, "9.6 million were non-Hispanic white, 3.1 million
were non-Hispanic black and 3.6 million were Hispanic." Id.
125. See Chandra A, Martinez et al., Fertility, Family Planning and Reproductive
Health of U.S. Women: Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 23 VITAL &
HEALTH STAT. 25, 101 (2005) (showing that Latina women are statistically more likely than
white women to fail to use any method of contraception); see also Rachel K. Jones et al.,
Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Having Abortions in 2000–2001, 34 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 294, 297 (2002) [hereinafter Jones et al., Contraceptive Use]
(showing that 4.3% of white study participants reported as never using contraception, versus
13.1% of Hispanic participants).
126. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
127. See, e.g., Janet B. Hardy et. al., Adolescent Childbearing Revisited: The Age of
Inner-City Mothers at Delivery Is a Determinant of Their Children’s Self-Sufficiency at Age
27 to 33, 100 PEDIATRICS 802–09 (1997) (showing that a thirty-year follow-up study found
that the mother’s age at the time of the child’s birth was an important independent factor in
predicting the child’s well-being); John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Depression,
Parenthood, and Age at First Birth, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1281, 1295–96 (2002) (finding
maternal depression greater with younger age of first birth, and the least depression in firsttime mothers around age thirty); Antonio Merlo & Kenneth Wolpin, The Transition from
School to Jail: Youth Crime and High School Completion Among Black Males, PENN. INST.
FOR ECON. RES. (Sept. 2008), economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/08-033.pdf (mother’s
age at time of birth is an independent risk factor for boys’ incarceration).
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states, further increasing the human capital in the population.128 While
other factors also affect these developments—wealthier states, for example,
are also more urban and expensive and therefore less attractive to families
with young children,129 the results undermine support for a more
comprehensive national approach. Indeed, the factors that produce these
results have become some of the more politically divisive issues in
American politics over the last decade.
Contraceptive sex education. As Kristin Luker’s innovative work
demonstrates, attitudes toward sex education involve a "chasm, wide and
getting wider, between the sexual right and left . . . ."130 The Bush
administration insisted on funding abstinence-only programs in spite of
substantial evidence that they were less effective, and possibly
counterproductive, in comparison with comprehensive programs that
included both arguments for abstinence and accurate information about
contraception.131 Less well reported, however, has been the effect of such
programs in increasing class and racial disparities. A Clinton-era study
indicated that the percentage of African-American and Latina women
receiving abstinence-only instruction in lieu of other forms of sex education
exceeded the portion of white women receiving such instruction, and that
women living below 200% of the poverty level were more likely to receive
abstinence-only instruction—or no sex education at all—than were higherincome women.132 Moreover, at the time of their first sexual encounter,
128. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 131–33 (2008) (showing the increasing percentage of young
people with college degrees migrating to central cities and wealthy suburbs).
129. See Steve Sailer, Value Voters, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, Feb. 11, 2008, available
at http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/feb/11/00016/ (showing, for example, that
wealthy, urban areas, such as the San Francisco Bay area, are more expensive to raise
children and tend to be less family oriented and boast significant liberal populations). By
contrast, areas such as Dallas-Fort Worth are half as expensive to raise children, tend to
attract families from across the country, and produce more socially conservative voters. Id.
130. KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON SEX—AND SEX
EDUCATION—SINCE THE SIXTIES 91 (2006).
131. See, e.g., Hazel Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only
Education: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 12,
38–42 (2006) (summarizing reviews of various abstinence programs’ effectiveness); Hannah
Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the Promise: The STD Consequences of Adolescent
Virginity Pledges, 36 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271, 273–77 (2005) ("Pledgers are
consistently less likely to be exposed to risk factors across a wide range of indicators, but
their STD infection rate does not differ from nonpledgers."); Naomi Cahn & June Carbone,
Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 494–98 (2008)
(summarizing evidence pointing to the ineffectiveness of abstinence-only education).
132. Laura D. Lindberg et al., Changes in Formal Sex Education: 1995–2002, 38
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two-thirds of white women had received instruction about contraception
compared with fewer than half of African-Americans.133 The assumption
that teens receive "sex education" outside of school programs or that
discussion of contraception is likely to undermine support for abstinence is
least likely to be true for the groups most at risk.134
Contraception.
Today, it seems remarkable that the first
comprehensive federal efforts to increase access to birth control were
bipartisan. In 1970, President Richard Nixon signed Title X of the Public
Health Service Act,135 which created "a comprehensive federal program
devoted entirely to the provision of family planning services on a national
basis."136 The vote for passage was unanimous in the Senate and
overwhelming in the House (298 to 32).137 Kristin Luker explains: "When
poor women were having unwanted, out-of-wedlock births in such large
numbers (out-of-wedlock births were assumed to be unwanted births), and
when unwanted babies seemed to be swelling the AFDC roles, an archaic
birth control policy that kept contraceptives out of the hands of the poor
seemed ludicrous, if not tragic."138
The results may be no less tragic today, but without AFDC as a
political issue, support for contraception has waned.139 In 2006, half of all
pregnancies in the United States were unplanned,140 but the rates varied
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 182, 185–86 (2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/3818206.pdf.
133. Id. (citing statistics).
134. See MARK D. REGNERUS, FORBIDDEN FRUIT: SEX & RELIGION IN THE LIVES OF
AMERICAN TEENAGERS 65 (2007) (finding that evangelical parents are most likely to believe
that discussing contraception sends mixed messages, but observing considerable variation
between African-American and white teen attitudes about the possibility of restricting sexual
activity).
135. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1001–08) (LexisNexis 2010).
136. GUTTMACHER INST. FACTS IN BRIEF: TITLE X AND THE U.S. FAMILY PLANNING
EFFORT (1997), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ib16.html.
137. KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY
59 (1996).
138. Id. at 57.
139. Cf. Tonya Brito, From Madonna Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 416 (1999) (arguing that "because
the prevailing images of welfare mothers are pejorative, it has been difficult to win broadbased political support for progressive welfare reform proposals"). Congress abolished the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program when it passed "the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996." Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (West 1997).
140. GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2008)
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from twenty-nine unplanned pregnancies per 1,000 women aged fifteen to
forty-four for those with income 200% or more of the poverty line, rising to
eighty-one per 1,000 women whose income was 100%–199% of the
poverty line, and to 112 per 1,000 for those below the poverty line.141 The
disparities in unplanned pregnancies produce even greater disparities in
unplanned births: Eleven per 1,000 women for the most affluent group,
thirty-five per 1,000 for women at 100%–199% of the poverty line, and
fifty-eight per 1,000 for those in poverty, more than five times the rate of
the wealthiest group.142 Unintended pregnancies also vary significantly by
race.143 In the nineties, sixty-nine percent of African-American pregnancies
were unintended in comparison with forty percent of those for whites, and
fifty-four percent of Latina conceptions.144 Restrictions on public funding
for contraceptives disproportionately affect the most vulnerable.145
Abortion. Given limits on access to contraception, the availability
of abortion has become far more important to poorer women’s
reproductive autonomy than it is for wealthier women.146 In the United
States in 2000, for example, the poorest thirty percent of women of
reproductive age had fifty-seven percent of the abortions. 147 A
remarkable forty-three percent of all African-American pregnancies
ended in abortion compared to eighteen percent for whites and twentyfive percent for Latinas.148 Abortion rates also vary geographically.149
[hereinafter INDUCED ABORTION], http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
141. Rachel Benson Gold, Rekindling Efforts to Prevent Unplanned Pregnancy: A
Matter of "Equity and Common Sense," 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Summer 2006, at 2, 3,
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/3/gpr090302.pdf.
142. Id.
143. See INDUCED ABORTION, supra note 140 (citing statistics revealing the
disproportionate percentages of unintended pregnancies between white, black, and Hispanic
women).
144. Id.
145. See Gold, supra note 141, at 4–5 (discussing the lack of safe, affordable, and
effective contraceptives for low-income women and the need to expand Medicaid coverage
of contraceptive services in order to decrease the number of unintended pregnancies for lowincome women).
146. See INDUCED ABORTION, supra note 140 (explaining that the abortion rate among
women below the federal poverty level is over four times that of women above the poverty
level, largely due to the higher rate of unintended pregnancies).
147. Rachel K. Jones et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women
Obtaining Abortions in 2000–2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 226, 228–31
(2002) [hereinafter Jones et al., Patterns], http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3422602.pdf.
148. Id.
149. See GUTTMACHER INST., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY, supra note 112, at 13–14 (ranking
abortion rates by state); see also Jones et al., Patterns, supra note 147, at 231 (noting that
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The states150 with the highest teen abortion ratios (i.e., the number of
abortions per 100 live births) are New Jersey, New York,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland, all in the Northeast;151 the
highest ratio for adults (i.e., the number of abortions per 1,000 live
births) are New York, Delaware, Washington, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island.152 The states153 with the lowest teen abortion ratios are
Utah, Kentucky, South Dakota, Louisiana, and Arkansas;154 the states
with the lowest adult abortion ratios are Colorado, Utah, Idaho, South
Dakota, and Kentucky.155 Based on these statistics, abortion has been a
much more important component in the reduction of overall fertility in
the relatively diverse Mid-Atlantic States than in other parts of the
country.
The more conservative states have enacted legislation that
restricts access to abortion, and abortion clinics have largely
disappeared from the overwhelming majority of rural, and conservative
suburban counties.156 Abortion restrictions have kept abortion rates
low in states such as South Dakota,157 while more effective
because abortion services are concentrated in cities, it is often easier for women residing in
metropolitan counties to obtain these services).
150. Excluding the District of Columbia.
151. GUTTMACHER INST., TEEN PREGNANCY, supra note 112, at 11.
152. Laurie D. Elam-Evans et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2000,
MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY. REP.: CDC SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES (Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 28, 2003, at 1, 18–19 tbl.3, 29, http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5212.pdf.
153. Excluding the District of Columbia.
154. GUTTMACHER INST., TEEN PREGNANCY, supra note 112, at 11. If we were to
measure teen abortion rates as opposed to ratios, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland
would remain in the top five, but Massachusetts and Connecticut would be replaced by
Nevada and California. Id. The lowest abortion rates also would change, with Utah, South
Dakota, and Kentucky remaining in the top five, but North Dakota and West Virginia
replacing Louisiana and Arkansas. Id.
155. Elam-Evans et al., supra note 152, at 18, 29. Florida and Louisiana had low rates
as well, but did not report the number of abortions with respect to in-state residents. Id.
156. See Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for
Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 16 (2007) (estimating
that between eighteen percent and thirty-five percent of women who wanted an abortion
continued their pregnancy because of the inability to obtain funding); Rachel K. Jones et al.,
Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 13 (2008) [hereinafter Jones et al., Incidence], available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/4000608.pdf (reporting that in 2005, ninety-two
percent of non-metropolitan women and twenty-four percent of those in metropolitan areas
lacked an abortion facility in their county).
157. See Boonstra, supra note 156, at 13 (noting that South Dakota is the only state to
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contraception in other states has contributed to the overall reduction in
abortion rates for the country as a whole.158 The New York Times
reports, however, that the largest recent declines in abortion rates were
not due to the legal restrictions.159 Instead:
Almost two-thirds of the decline in the total number of abortions can be
traced to eight jurisdictions with few or no abortion restrictions—New
York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Illinois, California, Oregon,
Washington State and the District of Columbia, . . . places . . . that have
shown a commitment to real sex education, largely departing from the
Bush administration’s abstinence-only approach. These jurisdictions
also help women avoid unintended pregnancies by making contraception
160
widely available.

The national picture of family change, of course, includes
multiple dimensions. Indeed, the big story during the nineties
involved substantial declines in both teen births161 and abortions. 162
Careful review of the statistics indicates that greater abstinence was a
factor, but that increases in abstinence overwhelmingly delayed sexual
activity from the mid-teens to the later teens—not into marriage.163
exclude public funding for abortion in cases of rape and incest unless necessary to protect
the woman’s life).
158. See Jones et al., Incidence, supra note 156, at 15 ("The long-term decline in
abortion incidence continued through 2005. . . . Data are not yet available to determine the
reasons for the continuing decline, but they likely include a range of circumstances, such as
better contraceptive use . . . ."); Boonstra, supra note 156, at 13 (noting that South Dakota is
the only state to limit state funding to cases necessary to save the life of the mother, and is
the only state to exclude public funding for abortion in cases of rape and incest unless
necessary to protect the woman’s life).
159. See Editorial, Behind the Abortion Decline, N.Y. TIMES, January 26, 2008, at A16
(reporting that the decline in abortion rates is likely explained by increased pregnancy
prevention rather than by states making it harder for women to obtain abortions).
160. Id. See generally Cicely Marston & John Cleland, Relationships Between
Contraception and Abortion: A Review of the Evidence, 29 INT’L FAM. P LAN. PERSP. 6
(2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2900603.pdf (reviewing the
empirical literature on the relationship between the availability of contraception and
abortion).
161. See John S. Santelli, et al., Explaining Recent Declines in Adolescent Pregnancy in
the United States: The Contribution of Abstinence and Increased Contraceptive Use, 97
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 150, 150 (2007), available at http://opr.princeton.edu/seminars/
papers%5CRecent_declines_in_adol_pregnancy_NSFG.pdf (noting that after 1991, the rate
of adolescent pregnancy in the United States declined dramatically).
162. See Jones et al., Incidence, supra note 156, at 6 (reporting that the number of
abortions in the United States declined after reaching an all-time high in 1990).
163. See Santelli et al., supra note 161, at 154 (noting that although more adolescents in
the United States are delaying initiation of sexual intercourse, the impact of this change on
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Overall, the studies attributed eighty-six percent of the reduction to
more effective contraception, with contraception as a particularly
critical factor for eighteen- to -nineteen-year-olds.164 Since 2005, teen
birth rates have inched back up and the largest increases have occurred
in the African-American community.165
Studies of family stability, of the well-being of children born to
single mothers, and of the likelihood of divorce, all find that later age
of family formation is an important protective factor.166 Yet today,
these factors are the product of different family systems. The five
states with the lowest median age of marriage are the states with high
teen birth and low abortion rates: Utah (22.8 for women, 25.2 for
men), Idaho (23.5, 25.5), Arkansas (24.0, 25.7), Oklahoma (24.5,
25.9), and Kansas (24.7, 26.3).167 Correspondingly, the states with the
pregnancy risk is small and confined to younger teenagers aged 15 to 17).
164. Id. at 153–54 ("We estimated that fourteen percent of the change observed among
15- to 19-year-olds was attributable to a decrease in the percentage of sexually active young
women . . . and that eighty-six percent was attributable to changes in contraceptive method
use . . . ."). All of the change in pregnancy risk among 18- and 19-year-olds can be
attributed to increased contraceptive use. Id.
165. See Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2006, 56 NAT’L VITAL
STAT. REP., no. 7, Dec. 5, 2007, at 2, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/
nvsr56_07.pdf (reporting that the pregnancy rate among adolescents fell thirty-four percent
between 1991 and 2005 before it reversed in 2006, rising by three percent among females
aged 15–19). The largest single-year increase was reported for non-Hispanic black
teenagers, whose overall rate increased by five percent. Id. The pregnancy rate increased by
two percent for Hispanic teenagers, three percent for non-Hispanic white teenagers, and four
percent for AIAN teenagers. Id.
166. See SAUL D. HOFFMAN, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, BY THE
NUMBERS: THE PUBLIC COSTS OF TEEN CHILDBEARING 114–16 (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/pubs/BTN_Full.pdf (reporting that a
mother’s educational attainment and earnings, a father’s earnings, and a child’s health,
educational attainment, and earnings all decrease with teen births); see also Jamie Lynn
Spears and Teen Pregnancy, THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY (2009),
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/media/jls.aspx (noting that children of teen mothers do
not do as well in school as children of older mothers) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE
TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 79 (2007) [hereinafter AMATO ET AL.,
ALONE TOGETHER] (reporting that divorce proneness declines with age at time of marriage).
167. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. FACT FINDER, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
2007, MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE FOR WOMEN, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&ds_name=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&-redo
Log=false&-format=US-9&-mt_name=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_GCT1205_US9&-CONTEXT=gct
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (citing statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE
FOR MEN, http://factfinder. census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&ds_name=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-format=US-9&-mt_name
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highest median age of marriage have low teen birth and high abortion
rates: Massachusetts (28.5, 29.9), New York (28.0, 29.9), Rhode
Island (28.1, 29.3), Connecticut (27.5, 29.4), and New Jersey (27.5,
29.4).168 The high average age of marriage and first birth figures
correspond closely; in 2000, the mean age of the mother at her first
live birth for the country as a whole was 24.9; Massachusetts had the
highest mean age, at 27.8, followed by Connecticut (27.2), New Jersey
(27.1), New Hampshire (26.7), and New York (26.4).169 The marriage
and first birth figures correspond less closely at the other end in large
part because of racial differences.170 The states with the lowest median
age of first birth tend to have higher concentrations of minority
women, who are less likely to marry: Mississippi had the lowest
(22.5), followed by Arkansas (22.7), Louisiana and New Mexico
(23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2).171 Over the past thirty
years, all states have experienced an increase in the mean age at which
the first child is born for mothers,172 but the changes range from a 5.3
year increase in Massachusetts to a 1.9 year increase in Utah.173 With
the highest rates of change concentrated in the Northeast and MidAtlantic States, and the smallest rates of change in the states with the
lowest average ages of birth, the gap between the states is growing.174
=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_ GCT1204_US9&-CONTEXT=gct (last visited Feb. 23, 2010)
(same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
These reports show that Kansas is fifth in terms of overall totals, but Wyoming is fifth for
women (24.1), while Alabama is for men (26.2).
168. Id.
169. T.J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970–2000, 51 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 11, 2002, at 1, 10, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/
nvsr51_01.pdf.
170. See id. at 3 (explaining that states with higher proportions of black, Hispanic, and
American Indian women can be expected to have lower mean ages at first birth).
171. Id. at 10.
172. See id. at 1 ("The mean age of mother has increased steadily in the United States
over the last three decades."). The mean age of women having their first live birth has
increased by 3.5 years in the past three decades. Id. at 2.
173. Id. at 3.
174. See id. at 10 (reporting the absolute change in the mean age of mother at first live
birth by State from 1970 to 2000). The jurisdictions with the greatest increase in age were
Massachusetts (5.3 years), New Hampshire (5.1), Connecticut (4.7), District of Columbia
(4.7), and New Jersey (4.7). Id. The states with the smallest increase were Utah (1.9), New
Mexico (2.0), Wyoming (2.2), Oklahoma (2.4), and Louisiana and Alaska (2.5). Id.
Looking at just the 1990s, however, the areas with the biggest jump in age as of first birth
were the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and New Jersey,
North Carolina, and Virginia. Id. The states with the least change were Wyoming and
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B. Recognizing the Effect of Family Systems on Work

If changing opportunities for women have helped transform family
understandings, so too has the changing family affected expectations about
employment.175 Unsurprisingly, the changing work-family interaction
breaks down very differently across class lines.176
Two incomes have become increasingly important for all but the
wealthiest Americans,177 yet college-educated women more successfully
combine work and family than other parts of the population. First, they
make more.178 In 2004, for example, women with only a high school
degree earned less than half that of college graduates and those with
graduate degrees earned even more.179
Second, college-educated women have an easier time combining
childrearing and employment, at least in part because they are better
prepared for children when they do have them, and enjoy more resources to
manage the tensions between the two.180 Early childbirth in contrast derails
education: almost 60% of teens with a school-age pregnancy drop out of
Alaska, which showed declines in age, New Mexico, which stayed the same, and South
Dakota and North Dakota. Id.
175. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 9 (2003) ("When
millions of mothers entered the workforce, they ratcheted up the price of a middle-class life
for everyone, including families that wanted to keep Mom at home. . . . To keep Mom at
home, the average single-income family must forfeit decent public schools and preschools,
health insurance, and college . . . .").
176. See infra discussion at notes 177–234 and accompanying text.
177. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 175, at 8–9 (arguing that two incomes are
increasingly needed to support a family so that the loss of one income puts families at
greater financial risk than in the past, when middle-class fathers could earn a "family wage"
and at-home mothers could get jobs to tide the family over economic rough patches).
178. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE,
AND RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2004, tbl.2B, http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/education/sipp2004w2.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (providing the average
monthly income in the United States by education, sex, age, and race and Hispanic origin for
2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
179. See id. (listing the average monthly income for women with a high school diploma
as $1,357, with a bachelor’s degree as $2,851, with a master’s degree as $3,733, with a
professional degree as $4,837, and with a doctorate as $5,180).
180. See HEATHER BOUSHEY, ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT? DEBUNKING THE MYTH 10
(2005), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/opt_out_2005_11_2.pdf (arguing that
highly educated, thirty-something mothers are advantaged over other mothers in terms of
educational attainment, earnings potential, marriage to spouses with very high earning
potentials, and in the benefits and workplace flexibility that makes work/family balance
easier).
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high school compared to the twenty-five percent who drop out without a
child.181 Educational attainment also affects the likelihood that a mother
will stay in the workforce.182 Economist Heather Boushey found that the
"child penalty"—the effect of having a child on labor force participation
rates—is negligible for highly educated women, while it is considerable for
women with less education; employment rates for women with less
education who had children at home were 21.7% less in 2004 than for those
women with the same education who did not have children at home, while
for women with a graduate degree, the "penalty" rate was 1.3%.183
Third, educational levels affect perceptions of work-family tensions.184
Nearly three-quarters of working fathers and two-thirds of working mothers
with children under eighteen went to the polls in 2008 with daily worries
about work-family issues.185 Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of
spouses who reported that the husband’s work interfered with family life
almost doubled, increasing from just fewer than twenty-five percent to
about forty-five percent of the public.186 The percentage reporting that the
wife’s employment interfered with family life also increased substantially,
from approximately seventeen percent to over thirty percent.187 In looking
at the last several decades, sociologists Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen
Gerson conclude that the biggest shift has been in the number of weekly

181. See Why It Matters: Teen Pregnancy and Education, THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO
PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY (Mar. 2010), http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/why-itmatters/pdf/education.pdf ("Less than half of mothers (40 percent) who have a child before
they turn 18 ever graduate from high school compared with about three-quarters of similarly
situated young women who delay child bearing until age 20 or 21.").
182. See BOUSHEY, supra note 180, at 10 (noting that the adjusted labor force
participation rate for women with children is higher for highly-educated women).
183. Id. at 11–12 tbls.5 & 6.
184. See Press Release, Rockefeller Family Fund, Election Poll Finds Work and Family
Issues—Amid Economic Worries—Are a Frequent Daily Concern for Majority of America’s
Voting Parents (Nov. 13, 2008), http://kelleycampaigns.homestead.com/RFF_release.pdf
(reporting that sixty-three percent of voters were more likely to support a candidate they
thought would help parents balance work and family).
185. See id. ("Daily worries about work and family responsibilities proved to be
frequent for 72 percent of working fathers and 74 percent of working mothers with children
under 18.").
186. See AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER, supra note 166, at 107 (citing statistics).
187. See id. (citing statistics). The percentage of husbands observing that their wife’s
job created tensions rose from just over 10% in 1980 to over 20% in 2000, while the wives’
reporting interference from their own job rose from about 22% to about 34% in the same
period. Id.
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hours worked by families rather than individuals, exacerbating time
binds.188
Nonetheless, the implications of these changes play out differently by
social class. It is often said that American workers work longer hours than
the rest of the industrialized world,189 and, in fact, a larger number of
Americans work longer hours per week than in most of the industrialized
world.190 Indeed, a larger number of women do so in the United States than
anywhere else on the globe.191 The average American, however, does not
necessarily work more than the average worker in a number of other
countries; instead, the hours of the most highly educated Americans have
increased.192 In 1965, the correlation between hours worked and leisure
time did not vary by class.193 Today, it varies inversely with socioeconomic
188. See JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY,
GENDER INEQUALITY 46 (2004) (noting the dramatic growth in the number of families
depending on the wife’s earnings and arguing that the demographic transformation of family
life without countervailing shifts in the time men spend away from the job explains the rise
of widespread work-family conflict).
189. See Americans Work Longest Hours Among Industrialized Countries, INT’L LABOR
ORG., Sept. 6, 1999, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/26/077.html ("US workers put
in the longest hours on the job in industrialized nations, clocking up nearly 2,000 hours per
capita in 1997, the equivalent of almost two working weeks more than their counterparts in
Japan . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
190. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the Overworked Americans?, 56
REV. SOC. ECON. 442, 442 (1998) [hereinafter Jacobs & Gerson, Overworked Americans]
(noting that the United States stands out as having among the highest percentage of workers
putting in 50 hours per week or more).
191. See id. at 449 (reporting that women in the United States have the longest work
week out of nine countries, including Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Since 1970, the percentage of men
and women in the United States working either long or short work weeks has increased. Id.
at 445. Approximately one in four men (25.2%) and one in ten women (10.8%) work at
least fifty hours per week. Id.; cf. JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA’S
WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 164 (2000)
(noting that the majority of working Americans are caring for children, elderly parents, or
disabled family members and endorse social change that would provide more flexible adult
work hours, extended children’s school hours, and a longer academic year).
192. See Jacobs & Gerson, Overworked Americans, supra note 190, at 445 ("Nearly
two in five American men with four or more years of college education work 50 hours per
week or more, compared to less than one in eight men with less than a high school degree.").
Nearly one in five college-educated American women work 50 or more hours per week,
compared to less than one in twenty with less than a high school degree. Id.
193. See Stephen E. Landsburg, The Sin of Wages: The Real Reason to Oppose the
Minimum Wage, SLATE, July 9, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2103486/ (arguing that the
real argument against the minimum wage is that it is an off-the-books tax paid by a small
group of people, with all the proceeds paid out as the equivalent of welfare to a different
AND
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status, with certain high paying and high status positions commanding the
greatest number of hours of employment while less skilled men work fewer
hours today than in the recent past, in large part because of
underemployment.194
For the most elite women—women with graduate and professional
degrees who hold jobs that demand more than forty-five hours a week—
career pressures produce lower rates of marriage and child-bearing, and
higher risk of divorce.195 Sociologist Paul Amato finds more generally,
however, that women college graduates who work full time enjoy greater
marital satisfaction and lower divorce risk than the rest of the population.196
He observes that, while two-earner couples spend less time together than
happily married couples of earlier generations, they also report less conflict
and fewer problems.197
They have successfully redesigned their
relationships to deal with the combination of greater resources and less
leisure.198
Instead, the families most adversely affected by work-family issues are
those traditional families in which the wife works full-time and would
prefer to work less but cannot because of her husband’s failure to earn
enough money to support the family.199 These couples show the greatest
small group of people) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
194. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 188, at 39–40 ("Although there are also less
affluent workers who put in substantial overtime or who work at two (or more) jobs, this
group represents a smaller proportion of blue-collar workers than do overworked Americans
who are professionals and managers.").
195. See AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER supra note 166, at 141 (noting specifically
that women’s working more than forty-five hours per week is associated with a small, but
statistically significant increase in divorce proneness and marital unhappiness); see also
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Keeping Women in Business (and Family), in SAMUEL GREGG &
JAMES R. STONER, JR., RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, manuscript at 96–97 (2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115468 (finding that
women with professional degrees have lower rates of marriage and higher rates of "failed or
failing relationships" relative to men with professional degrees or women college graduates)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
196. See AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER supra note 166, at 172 (noting that various
changes in marriage, including the increase in wives’ percentage of family income, are
collectively associated with aggregate increases in marital quality).
197. See id. at 138 (concluding that the movement of highly educated wives working
full-time had generally beneficial consequences for marriages).
198. See id. at 173 (discussing the shift from patriarchal, institutional marriage to a
more egalitarian, companionate form of marriage between 1980 and 2000, as more families
have become dual-earner arrangements).
199. See id. at 124 ("[W]ives who worked primarily for financial reasons and who
preferred to be working fewer hours tended to have relatively troubled marriages."). Indeed,
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dissatisfaction with the wife’s employment and experience the greatest
likelihood of marital dissolution. 200 In contrast, traditional couples who are
able to enjoy traditional family lives, with wives who work part-time or not
at all, enjoy high rates of marital stability, though not quite at the level of
better off dual-earner couples.201
While the country as a whole, therefore, experiences high rates of
dissatisfaction with work-family balance,202 little basis exists for a
consensus approach to the issues. Despite the fact that a higher percentage
of Americans see male rather than female employment as interfering with
family life,203 poorer and more traditional couples, particularly in hard
times, would prefer more, not less, male employment.204 Better off women
seek more flexible employment; more traditional women seek fewer overall
hours.205 More successful women have children only after completing
school and beginning careers; less successful women, who have children at
younger ages, often seek to better their labor market skills only after their
children are older.206
These differences play out not only in terms of different individual
preferences, but also in terms of the different political constituencies for
workplace reform. Better-educated workers, who have greater human
capital, already enjoy greater access to paid leave to deal with family and
health issues.207 Of those working parents who have incomes less than
the most troubled couples in Amato’s study were young, working class, dual earner couples.
Id. at 124.
200. See id. at 124, 168, 173 (describing the weaknesses of marriages in which wives
work more than they want to, especially when those wives hold traditional views on
marriage or are working-class employees).
201. See id. at 134 (noting that wives’ income has a direct positive effect on marital
problems, but that wives employed full-time may improve marital quality by increasing a
sense of economic well-being).
202. See id. at 25 ("The potential for work-family conflict has grown in recent
decades.").
203. See id. at 137 (citing a study in which interference from the husband’s job was a
stronger predictor of poor marital quality than was interference from the wife’s job).
204. See id. at 138 (explaining why the marriages of employed working-class wives are
particularly vulnerable to work-family strains).
205. See id. at 137 (noting that working-class wives would prefer to work fewer hours
or not at all).
206. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at ch. 12 (summarizing recent
developments).
207. See Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Law Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2007) ("From the 1960s to the 1990s, . . . access to
maternity leave for working-class women remained nearly constant, whereas access
increased more than fourfold for professional women.").
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200% of the federal poverty level, forty percent have no access to paid
leave at all (no paid sick days, vacation, or personal days).208 "Seventy-six
percent of low-wage workers do not have a single day of paid sick leave—
the most basic employment benefit."209 Indeed, as a general matter, lowwage workers are less likely than higher income workers to be covered by
family leave policies, to be eligible to take even unpaid family leave, or,
much less, to receive paid family leave.210 They are also less likely to have
access to flexible scheduling.211 From 1996 to 2000, women with a college
degree were three times more likely to take paid leave following the birth of
their first child (58.7%) than women with less than a high school education
(17.8%); while 56.4% of women with less than a high school education
took unpaid leave, only 38.6% of women with a college degree used unpaid
leave.212
These results are hardly surprising. More educated women are more
valuable to their employers, and the employers offer more flexibility and
208.

JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER & NIRALI PATEL, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATEANALYSIS OF PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 58 (2005), available at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/ParentalLeaveReportMay05.pdf?docID=
1052 (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
209. Id. at 10.
210. See O’Leary, supra note 207, at 8 (citing statistical discrepancies with respect to
access to disability policies, paid sick leave, and paid holidays between workers making
more than fifteen dollars per hour and those making less than fifteen dollars per hour). Ann
O’Leary reported this discrepancy as follows:
In March 2005, fifty-four percent of workers who made more than fifteen
dollars per hour had access to a short-term disability policy, while only twentyeight percent of workers earning less than fifteen dollars per hour had access to a
short-term disability policy. Similarly, forty-six percent of workers who made
over fifteen dollars per hour had access to long-term disability leave, while only
sixteen percent of workers making less than fifteen dollars per hour had access
to long-term disability leave. There are similar disparities in access to paid sick
leave and paid holidays. Eighty-eight percent of workers making more than
fifteen dollars per hour had access to paid holidays, and seventy-five percent of
these workers had access to paid sick leave. Meanwhile, sixty-eight percent of
workers earning less than fifteen dollars per hour had access to paid holidays,
and only forty-seven percent had access to paid sick leave.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
211. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WORK LIFE LAW, UC HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, ONE
SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: WHEN "OPTING OUT" IS NOT AN OPTION 8 (2006),
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/onesickchild.pdf ("[F]lexible
scheduling is available for nearly two-thirds of workers with incomes of more than $71,000
a year but to less than one-third of working parents with incomes less than $28,000.").
212. JULIA OVERTURF JOHNSON & BARBARA DOWNS, MATERNITY LEAVE AND
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961–2000 11 (Oct. 2005),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-103.pdf.
BY-STATE
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benefits to retain them.213 Less educated women, in addition to being less
able to secure benefits, invest less in employment; they are therefore more
likely to quit in the face of a child’s increased medical needs or a taxing
pregnancy and resume employment later.214 Nonetheless, state laws that
vary with the state’s wealth, political ideology, and family formation
patterns exacerbate the class divide.215 The National Partnership on
Women and Families developed a state-by-state scorecard of parental leave
programs.216 The highest-ranking states in adopting mandated leave
provisions were California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, followed by
Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, with some protections
in Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin.217 Unsurprisingly,
all of the states to act were in the Northeast, West Coast or upper Midwest
(plus Hawaii), all are relatively liberal, and all are well on their way toward
embracing the new pathways to middle class status.218
For poorer states, the more immediate challenge is not family leave—
which may simply make employment more expensive and harder to come
by.219 Instead, the bigger challenge requires revisiting the relationships
between family formation, work, and education. For most, the twenties has
become a period of exploration.220 More affluent and ambitious Americans
213. See id. at 10 ("Increasing levels of education go hand-in-hand with increases in the
use of paid leave benefits.").
214. Cf. id. at 16 (explaining that women who have invested in their careers by way of
education, training, and wages prefer to maintain ties to the labor force).
215. See June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 950 (2008) [hereinafter Carbone, Age Matters] ("Background
state laws exacerbate the class differences.").
216. See 2009–2010 Assets and Opportunities Scorecard: Family Leave Benefits and
Protection, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., http://scorecard.cfed.org/business.php?
page=family_leave_benefits_protection (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) (comparing state
policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
217. See id. (demonstrating that few states have such policies); Working Families Need
Paid Family and Medical Leave, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & CHILD.,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/WF_PL_FactSheet_PaidFamilyLeave_20
09.pdf?docID=4682&autologin=true (citing those states with paid leave programs as
indicative of building momentum for the increasing support of such programs nationwide)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
218. See Carbone, Age Matters, supra note 215, at 950 ("Particularly with respect to the
protections mandated for private employers, the states that require such protections are
wealthier, more liberal and more likely to vote Democratic.").
219. See id. at 950 n.215 (acknowledging the argument that increased employer
mandates make job creation more expensive and thus result in greater unemployment).
220. See id. at 932 (noting that the twenties "may involve an unmooring from the
institutions that once provided guidance").
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spend their late teens and much of their twenties in school or in temporary
positions that add to their human capital.221 In contrast, lower income men
in this age group are dramatically less likely to be either in school or
employed on a regular basis.222 For the least advantaged men, prison has
become the single institution most likely to shape the transition to
adulthood.223
Those who secure employment, moreover, have become less likely to
retain it. Employment turnover in the economy as a whole has risen,
placing a greater premium on the ability to acquire new skills and seek out
new opportunities.224 For example, Henry Farber reports that "by virtually
any measure, more recent cohorts of workers have been with their current
employers for less time at specific ages."225 The drop in long-term
employment for men has been dramatic,226 increasing the insecurity of early
marriage and the corresponding importance of women’s employment across
the board.227
221. See Fast Facts: Work and Education, THE NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO
ADULTHOOD, http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/trends/facts_wa.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2010) (indicating that young adults in the top income quartile receive seventy percent more
in the way of material assistance from their parents during this period than young adults in
the bottom quartile, even though they are only ten to fifteen percent more likely to attend
college) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
222. See Mary Corcoran & Jordan Matsudaira, Is It Getting Harder to Get Ahead?, 11
MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2
(Oct.
2004),
http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/chap%2011-formatted.pdf
("More than fourteen percent of white men and forty percent of African American men had
accumulated at least 26 weeks of nonwork over three years. Almost one in four African
American men reported 52 or more weeks of nonwork between ages 24 and 26.").
223. See Stephen Raphael, Early Incarceration Spells and the Transition to Adulthood,
31 MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD & PUB. POL’Y 31
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/raphaelformatted.pdf ("Young men in their early twenties are especially likely to have served time.
Their risk of imprisonment has tripled between 1979 and 2001. For all racial and ethnic
groups, less-educated men are considerably more likely to be incarcerated than more
educated men.").
224. See Carbone, Age Matters, supra note 215, at 953 ("[T]he rate of employment
turnover has increased in the economy as a whole, making the ability to acquire new skills,
seek new employment, and manage the period in between jobs more critical for every social
class.").
225. Henry S. Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in Long-Term
Employment in the U.S., 1973–2005, THE NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD, at 2
(May 2006), available at http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/farber%20with%20
cover%20sheet.pdf.
226. See id. at 23 (writing that long-term employment has become much less common
for males).
227. See AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER supra note 166, and accompanying text
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Uncertain economic prospects increase both the pay-off for dual earner
couples (one can see the other through lay-offs, returns to school, and
extended job hunts) and the financial tensions that increase divorce rates.228
At the same time, the increased importance of dual incomes makes better
integration of work and family pressures more important to both
employment and family satisfaction.229 This combination should increase
support for a new social contract—one that shapes understandings about
employer accommodations for sick children, mandatory overtime, and parttime employment. So long as part of the country has unequivocally
embraced the new family system while another influential part resists the
reshaping of the workplace it requires, however, national action will be
hard to come by.
IV. Conclusion
Family change has aggravated regional and class divisions, both
politically and practically.230 The college-educated middle class has reaped
the benefits of a new family system, which encourages investment in
women’s as well as men’s employment, deregulates sexual expression,
creates incentives to postpone the assumption of family responsibilities, and
trains young people for decision-making during an extended period of
career preparation and personal exploration.231 More traditional working
class and lower level white-collar employees, especially those who live in
more rural or religious areas of the country, have resisted the terms of the
new order.232

(citing dissatisfaction of wives who work out of necessity to supplement their husbands’
incomes).
228. See id. at 124, 141 (explaining that dual earner arrangements are less satisfying
and more problematic for lower earners in part because they derive less satisfaction from
employment and have fewer resources to purchase assistance with domestic responsibilities).
229. See generally LOTTE BAILYN ET AL., INTEGRATING WORK AND FAMILY LIFE: A
HOLISTIC
APPROACH,
SLOAN
WORK-FAMILY
POL’Y
NETWORK
(2001),
http://web.mit.edu/workplacecenter/docs/WorkFamily-sum.pdf (addressing the challenges of
integrating work and family life).
230. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing how family life has become "an engine of
economic inequality").
231. See id. (noting that the middle class has "embraced the move to new, practical, and
normative understandings about family life").
232. See id. (explaining that more traditional areas of the country view new morality as
a threat to their family system).
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In and of itself, it is unsurprising that different parts of the country
experience family change at different rates or share different
understandings about family norms. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution assigns
family law to the states precisely because of the greater ability of smaller
political units to take regional variation into account.233 What is of concern
is not the regional variation in laws and practices; instead, it is the use of
the different needs of one group to block consideration of the needs of
others.234
Part of what has fueled the ire of more religious and conservative
families is the fact that the national media culture—Hollywood
entertainment in particular—does not reflect their values.235 Yet, the
response of a more politically muscular Christian right has been to promote
policies that reflect their own values at the expense of groups that may
either not share them, or even if they subscribe to a more religious approach
to public issues, may not be able to realize the benefits.236
Some of the differences are simply irreconcilable. Representative
Henry Hyde, the author of the successful efforts to block abortion funding,
admitted in 1977, for example, that "I certainly would like to prevent, if I
could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class
woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is
the . . . Medicaid bill."237 In other words, Hyde was quite willing, in the
name of antiabortion activism, to promote measures that would leave
middle class women’s ability to secure an abortion intact, while
disproportionately restricting poor women’s access.
Today, restrictive efforts are farther reaching because they target the
whole range of public assistance in limiting unwanted births: sex
education, which is of greatest importance to teens who lack supportive
parents or other reliable sources of information; public subsidization of
effective contraception, which may be particularly critical to those who do
not have health care insurance; and abortion, which disproportionately

233. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 381 (2007) (noting the Supreme Court’s shift
away from an analysis of divorce law based on the competing interests of different states).
234. See Part III.A (citing that poorer states block assistance that might further
undermine their traditional practices).
235. See Part II.B.2 (describing the media’s celebration of newfound sexual freedom).
236. See Part III.A (characterizing the conservative response to family changes as a
"call to arms").
237. 123 CONG. REC. H19, 698–19, 715 (daily ed. June 17, 1977).
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affects minority women and others who lack either the ability to control
their own sexuality or access to effective birth control.238
The result of these policies in turn aggravates class inequalities as the
reinforcing cycles produce different fertility rates between rich and poor,
increase the differences in educational achievement as poor women have
children at younger ages with fewer emotional and monetary resources to
invest in their offspring, and reduce the productivity of less educated
workers, who cycle in and out of the workforce, in and out of relationships,
and too often in and out of their children’s lives.
Rebuilding the foundation for a more productive workforce requires
reexamining the connection between work and family and the material
sources of class differences. Reproductive patterns will determine the
nature of tomorrow’s workforce as much as, if not more than, employment
policies taken on their own. I accordingly recommend that any more honest
assessment of these issues must examine the complex relationship between
work and family, and quite literally change the subject in three important
ways:
1. More realistically address preparation for family life.
Marriage proponents, who have discovered that neither the
restrictive provisions of covenant marriage nor lesser access to
abortion have much impact on nonmarital birth and divorce
rates, have turned their attention to marriage education
classes.239 These classes have been designed around surveys
that ask the divorced what contributed to their marital breakups.240 Respondents list the factors contributing to their
divorces in the following order: "lack of commitment"
(seventy-three percent), "too much arguing" (fifty-six percent),
"infidelity" (fifty-five percent), "marrying too young" (fortysix percent), "unrealistic expectations" (forty-five percent),
"lack of equality in the relationship" (forty-four percent), and
"domestic violence" (twenty-nine percent).241
Forty-one
percent added that a lack of premarital preparation contributed
238. See supra Part III.A (describing factors that contribute to class differences in
embracing family changes).
239. See Scott Stanley, Making a Case for Premarital Education, 50 FAM. REL. 272,
272 (2001) (promoting the benefits of premarital education).
240. NAT’L FATHERHOOD INITIATIVE, WITH THIS RING . . . A NATIONAL SURVEY ON
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 32 (2005), available at http://www.fatherhood.org/doclibrary
/nms.pdf.
241. Id. at 32.
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to their divorce.242 While the classes themselves have gotten
mixed reviews, the undertaking marks a healthy
acknowledgment that maturity, gender roles, and preparation
have something to do with the quality of family life.243
2. Focus on procreation rather than sex, and contraception rather
than abortion. The antiabortion movement is more about
mobilizing partisans than solving problems. Refocusing on
the high rate of unplanned pregnancies in the United States
and the disproportionate impact on the poor and the vulnerable
(in short, those least prepared to care for the resulting
children) should garner greater support for avoiding the
unwanted births.
3. Consider the multiple interactions between work and family.
High income couples worry about the disproportionate impact
of family obligations on career success (the "mommy
track"),244 but lower income couples are caught in a cycle in
which financial pressure pushes them into unsatisfying jobs
that exacerbate family tensions that in turn undermine both the
parents’ and children’s prospects for the future.245 Rebuilding
the relationship between work and family requires greater
attention to getting parents into the workforce, through family
sensitive efforts at education and training, and making it
possible for them to remain productive workers without
undermining the prospects for the next generation.
Today, we have created an economy in which those on the other side
of the reorganization of work, family, and gender have profited
handsomely, and those most threatened are blocking the pathways for
everyone else. It is time to see cultural conflict for what it is: class
warfare at its most counterproductive.
242. Id. at 29.
243. See Scott M. Stanley et al., Premarital Education, Marital Quality, and Marital
Stability: Findings from a Large, Random Household Survey, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 117
(2006); see also Jason S. Carroll & William J. Doherty, Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Premarital Prevention Programs: A Meta-Analytic Review of Outcome Research, 52 FAM.
REL. 105, 105–18 (2003) (evaluating the effectiveness of premarital prevention programs).
244. See AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER, supra note 166, at 102 (noting that welleducated wives give up high earning potential by avoiding employment in order to raise
children).
245. See id. (describing the connection between financial pressure, employment, and
marital problems).

